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Comments
California's Characterization of Credit
Acquisitions During The Post-Separation
Period
In California, the community property is liable for debts incurred
during separation. However, proceeds from these debts may be
characterized as separate property of the acquiring spouse. Thus,
the community, even though suffering the risks of liability, is dis-
allowed the benefits of such risks. This Comment examines both
credit acquisitions and debt liability during separation. This Com-
ment argues that the current lender's intent analysis applied upon
credit acquisition should be discontinued in favor of the exposure
analysis. Further, the Comment argues that community property
debt liability during separation arises only if the debt is related to
the community which occurs a) if the liability benefits the commu-
nity; or b) if the loan was obtained in exchange for community
property.
I. INTRODUCTION
Property acquired during separation is presumed to be the sepa-
rate property of the acquiring spouse.' This presumption may persist
even though the property was acquired via a credit transaction.
1. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5118 (West 1985), which states "[t]he earnings and accu-
mulations of a spouse and the minor children living with or in the custody of, the spouse,
while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the
spouse."
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However, the community is presumed to be liable for all debts in-
curred during marriage.2 Thus, while a single spouse may obtain the
acquisition for his or her own separate property, the community may
be liable for the debt upon default.
This Comment propounds that credit acquisition should be charac-
terized in an equitable fashion in accordance with the debts incurred
while obtaining the property. Accordingly, debts incurred during
separation should be characterized as community debts only if the
debt incurred is in exchange for community property or is related to
community property. As such, if the property is acquired on credit
during separation, the character of such property is either commu-
nity or separate in accordance with the liabilities incurred while ob-
taining the loan. The following is an introductory hypothetical fact
pattern to assist the reader in understanding the issue.
Husband and Wife were married for eight years, after which each
became disenchanted with the another and separated. During the
two and one-half years of separation, Husband continued to work.
Neither spouse had any separate property prior to marriage. How-
ever, while married, from both their efforts, they established A.B.
Research Corp., of which Husband held the controlling interest. The
corporation was extremely successful and had a fair market value of
$10 million. Husband's interest in the corporation was deemed en-
tirely community property.
During the separation period, Husband made a large investment
of approximately $1 million. The $1 million came from a loan by the
local bank. The application for credit was signed by Husband alone;
however he stated he was married, not separated. The basis upon
which Husband claimed the bank relied in granting the loan
included:
(1) repayment from Husband's income, expected to be ap-
proximately $200,000 for the year;
(2) Husband's net worth of approximately $6 million, cen-
tered primarily in A.B. Research stock and real estate;
(3) Husband's controlling interest in A.B. Research, which
has a $1 million unsecured working capital line of credit
at the local bank; and
(4) a letter from A.B. Research assuring repayment in the
event Husband defaulted.
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.110(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1988), which states
[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the community property is
liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage, regard-
less which spouse has the management and control of the property and regard-
less whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or to a judgment for
the debt.
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However, Husband did not default on the loan. In fact, the invest-
ment was turned over within the separation period prior to dissolu-
tion, reaping a $400,000 net profit. The questions that arise are:
Who receives the proceeds from this post-separation loan? Is Hus-
band entitled to the proceeds as his separate property, or are the
proceeds community property to be shared by Wife?
By codification California has attempted to clarify issues of char-
acterization of property as community or separate. However, the
codification, which is supplemented by case law, not only leaves gaps
in several areas but also appears to contradict itself, resulting in con-
fusion and inequitable results.
This Comment reviews the statutes and case law addressing the
characterization of property acquired on credit and the liabilities in-
curred during separation. In doing so, the Comment discusses the
lender's intent analysis, currently applied in California to determine
the property characterization of credit proceeds acquired throughout
the entire marriage, including the separation period, and its eviden-
tiary and equitable problems. This Comment also examines the ex-
posure analysis which characterizes credit acquisitions in accordance
with debts incurred, and its application in determining the character-
ization of property acquired on credit during separation. This Com-
ment then will explore credit liability during separation and the
qualification of California Civil Code section 5118 which, on its face,
should control all earnings and accumulations during separation. The
author advocates that not all property acquired during separation
should be the separate property of the acquiring spouse. Suggestions
for the separated debting spouse in avoiding the possibility of his or
her separate credit purchase from becoming the property of the com-
munity are provided, as well as suggestions for statutory amend-
ments and new legislation to deal with this problem.
II. LENDER'S INTENT ANALYSIS
California Civil Code section 5110 states a presumption that all
property acquired during marriage is community property. 3 This
presumption is fundamental to the community property system.4
However, California recognizes the right of either spouse to hold
property separately while married 5 which enables the spouse to hold
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1985).
4. Wilson v. Wilson, 76 Cal. 2d 119, 125-26, 172 P.2d 568, 572 (1945).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1985).
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not only both community and separate property assets, but also to
have individual assets which are a combination of both community
and separate property.6
Loan proceeds, and thus the property acquired with credit during
marriage, follow the fundamental presumption of community prop-
erty.7 This presumption is rebuttable by evidence that the lender re-
lied on the separate property of the acquiring spouse when extending
the loan.' However, reliance upon separate property does not neces-
sarily mean that the loan is secured with separate property.,
The lender's intent analysis is essentially an application of tracing,
which allows the spouse to characterize the loan proceeds as separate
property if the spouse can trace the acquisition of the property to a
separate property source.10 The question which arises, and which has
resulted in considerable litigation, is to what level must the tracing
extend? Must the lender rely solely on the spouse's separate prop-
erty, or is primary reliance sufficient?
Initially, California required proof that the lender relied entirely
on the existing separate property of the acquiring spouse prior to
characterizing the loan proceeds as separate property.1 However, in
1953, in Gudelj v. Gudelj,12 the California Supreme Court relaxed
the standard, stating that "[i]n the absence of evidence tending to
prove that the seller primarily relied upon the purchaser's separate
property in extending credit, the trial court must find in accordance
with [the section 5110] presumption." 1 3
In recent years courts, under the pretext of the Gudelj standard,
have found evidence of lender's intent in (a) reliance on or hypothe-
6. See Bruch, The Definition and Division of Marital Property in California:
Towards Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 771 (1982). The simplest example of
an asset which contains both community property and separate property is a bank ac-
count held during marriage. The spouses may place within the account a) their earnings
from a salary during marriage which unless expressed otherwise is generally community
property; and also b) earnings from a separate property investments which would gener-
ally be separate property of the spouse who owns the investments. The account becomes
commingled during marriage. However, upon dissolution, via tracing, the spouses can
generally recoup their separate property portion prior to the division of the community
asset.
7. Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 210, 259 P.2d 656, 661 (1953).
8. Id., 259 P.2d at 661.
9. See, e.g., Bank of California v. Connolly, 36 Cal. App. 3d 350, 375, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 485 (1972).
10. Cummings, The Division of Property Purchased On Credit Under California
Community Property Law: A Proposal For Reform, 17 PAc. L.J. 129, 141 (1985) (citing
H. VERRALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY 264-65
(1977)).
11. In re Marriage of Grinius, 166 Cal. App. 3d 1179, 1186, 212 Cal. Rptr. 803,
807 (1985) (citing Estate of Molbert, 57 Cal. 257, 259 (1881); Estate of Ellis, 203 Cal.
414, 416, 264 P. 743, 744 (1928)).
12. 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953).
13. Id. at 210, 259 P.2d at 661 (emphasis added).
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cation of separate property, 4 or (b) sole reliance on separate prop-
erty,15 or (c) extension of the loan on the faith of existing property
belonging to the acquiring spouse.' 6
As a result of the continuously inconsistent application of the
lender's intent analysis, California's Fourth District Court of Ap-
peals in In re Marriage of Grinius17 conducted an extensive review
and held:
[W]e restate the applicable standard: Loan proceeds acquired during mar-
riage are presumptively community property; however, this presumption
may be overcome by showing the lender intended to rely solely upon a
spouse's separate property and did in fact do so. Without satisfactory evi-
dence of the lender's intent, the general presumption prevails."'
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE LENDER'S INTENT ANALYSIS
The Grinius standard may restate the rule, but it fails to clarify
the confusion or resolve the inequities. The problem is twofold. First,
from an evidentiary standpoint, the courts rely upon the subjective
intent of the lender, a third party, to determine the characteristics of
the proceeds. 19 Additionally, the lender's intent is assessed at the
moment the loan is executed rather than at the date of trial. As a
consequence, the lender's intent may be difficult to ascertain because
the loan may have been approved years prior to the trial.
Second, from an equitable standpoint, the Grinius standard is too
harsh, since any evidence indicating that the lender relied on any
source but the separate property results in characterizing the prop-
erty as community property. However, if the court is inclined to re-
vert to the Gudelj standard, it is also inequitable, for it is too arbi-
14. Grinius, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1187, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (citing Bank of
California v. Connolly, 36 Cal. App. 3d 250, 375, 111 Cal. Rptr. 468, 485 (1973); Ford
v. Ford, 276 Cal. App. 2d 9, 13-14, 80 Cal. Rptr. 435, 438-39 (1969); Somps v. Somps,
350 Cal. App. 2d 328, 336-37, 58 Cal. Rptr. 304, 310 (1967); Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal.
App. 2d 144, 153, 27 Cal. Rptr. 307, 313 (1962)).
15. Grinius, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1187, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (citing Howard v.
Howard, 128 Cal. App. 2d 180, 186, 275 P.2d 88, 92 (1954)).
16. Grinius, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1187, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (citing In re Mar-
riage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 455-56, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 674 (1979); In re
Marriage of Stoner, 147 Cal. App. 3d 858, 863-64, 195 Cal. Rptr. 351, 354-55 (1983)).
For a more in depth review of the inconsistencies in the lender's intent application
prior to Grinius, see generally Young, Community Property Classification of Credit Ac-
quisition in California: Law Without Logic?, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 173 (1981).
17. 166 Cal. App. 3d 1179, 212 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1985).
18. Id. at 1187, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (emphasis added).
19. Young, supra note 16, at 175. Even though Young's analysis confronted the
Gudelj lender's intent rule, the same holds true for the Grinuis lender's intent rule.
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trary to assess which assets were primarily relied upon. Furthermore,
and most importantly, a spouse, as part of the community, shares the
debt liability incurred by the borrowing spouse before or during mar-
riage; 0 but the non-borrowing spouse is disallowed any benefits of
the acquisition regardless of the fact that it was the community's
line of credit that made the acquisition possible.2
A closer review of Grinius reveals the extent of these problems. In
Grinius, shortly after marriage, the husband and wife acquired a res-
taurant.2 2 To purchase the restaurant they obtained two loans in-
cluding an $80,000 Small Business Administration Guaranty lent by
California First Bank (hereinafter SBA loan).2
At trial, the husband claimed that the restaurant real property
was his sole separate propeity. However, the husband failed to pro-
duce any direct evidence of the lender's intent and relied entirely
upon circumstantial evidence to prove that the lender relied solely on
the husband's separate property in extending the SBA loan.24 The
husband claimed that "the SBA loan guaranty was premised solely
on [his] posting of collateral consisting of his entire separate prop-
erty."25 The court disagreed with his assertion, apparently following
the principle that the most probative evidence of intent of an actor is
the objective evidence of what happened, "[flor normally the actor is
presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds."12 6
Thus, the court reviewed the SBA loan conditions outlined in the
loan guaranty authorization,27 believing this objective evidence best
identified the subjective intention of the lenders. The evidence re-
futed the husband's contentions, since only two of the nine required
conditions of the SBA loan necessitated hypothecation of his sepa-
rate property.2
8
In reviewing the evidentiary problems of the Grinius test, a
spouse's inability to present direct evidence of a lender's intent, like
the husband in Grinius, is not unusual. As a practical matter it is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to present evidence of actual
subjective intent. To do so, the spouse with the burden of proving
sole intent of the lender must either subpoena the lender or present a
written agreement between the parties identifying the lender's intent.
To subpoena the lender, the spouse initially must identify the lending
officer or officers who executed the loan and then locate their where-
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.110(a).
21. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5118.
22. Grinius, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1184, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
23. Id., 212 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
24. Id. at 1187, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
25. Id., 212 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
26. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
27. Grinius, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1187, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
28. Id., 212 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
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abouts. The difficulty of this request is compounded by the passage
of time, which in Grinius exceeded six years.29 Likewise, a written
agreement expressing the parties' intent is also unlikely to exist,
since at the time the loan was executed it is doubtful that the parties
anticipated a divorce so as to be concerned with the division and
characterization of marital property. Therefore, the likelihood that
the parties would have executed an agreement expressing their inten-
tions is remote.
Thus, in Grinius, circumstantial evidence was all that remained
for the husband to prove his case. The circumstantial evidence con-
sisted solely of the assets pledged and the lender's guidelines in au-
thorizing the loan. This evidence was somewhat unpredictable and
inconsistent. In Grinius, the SBA loan approval required: (a) a third
deed of trust on husband's improved real property, which was al-
ready subject to prior liens; (b) the husband's assigning his separate
property stock to the lender; (c) the wife's signature on the promis-
sory note and all other instruments of hypothecation; (d) the com-
munity acquiring and assigning an $80,000 life insurance policy on
the husband to the lender; and (e) a second deed of trust on the
restaurant real property and improvements."0 However, the decisive
factor which the court relied upon to rebut the husband's contention
was a clause in the SBA loan guidelines which restricted the exten-
sion of a small business loan to only those individuals with ability to
repay and manage the small business. 3 The court concluded that it
was the community, not the husband alone, who had the repayment
and management ability.32 As a result, the loan was not traceable
solely to the husband's separate property. Therefore, the proceeds
were deemed community property.
Apart from the evidentiary problems of the Grinius standard, the
courts have also consistently failed to reach equitable solutions. This
easily can be demonstrated by a slight alteration to the Grinius
facts. For instance, even if the husband had presented evidence that
his separate real property on which the SBA loan was secured had a
fair market value of $200,000 at the time of the loan was executed,
and if the wife had no prior restaurant management experience, the
court still would have been inclined to rule that the proceeds were
29. Id. at 1185, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07. The facts given fail to reveal the date
of marriage. There is evidence, however, that they were married at the time the husband
paid a portion of the SBA loan principal in 1975, and that they separated in 1980.
30. Grinius, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1187, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
31. Id. at 1189, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 809-10.
32. Id., 212 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
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community property. To do otherwise would disregard the Grinius
requirement that the lender rely solely on separate property of the
acquiring spouse to characterize the asset as separate. For even in
these amended facts, there still exists evidence that the lender relied
on the community life insurance or other community property, since
both the husband and the wife signed the promissory notes. Further-
more, it is unrealistic in a modern commercial transaction to assume
that a lender will not try to secure the loan with all possible
resources.
If the courts felt inclined to reinstate the California Supreme
Court's Gudelj standard,33 the inequities nevertheless would persist
since it is impossible to accurately determine on which sources the
lender primarily intended to rely. For instance, in Grinius the hus-
band's real property already was encumbered, but the value of the
property was unknown. Likewise, his stocks were not valued.34 Fur-
thermore, the life insurance had no value until the husband's death,
and the other community property assets which would become as-
sessable by both the husband's and the wife's signature on the prom-
issory note were undisclosed. Even so, having only been married a
relatively short period prior to obtaining the loan, the community
assets undoubtedly would not be extensive.3 5 Finally, the wife's expe-
rience in the restaurant business may have been overshadowed by
the husband's business experience acquired elsewhere. Therefore,
with a multitude of possible assets to rely upon, and each having a
variance in value, it becomes impossible to consistently and equitably
state which assets, in fact, primarily were relied upon.
A solution to both the evidentiary and equitable downfalls of the
lender's intent analysis exists, whether it is the sole or primary reli-
ance standard. This solution may be found in the exposure
analysis.36
IV. THE EXPOSURE ANALYSIS, A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE
CHARACTERIZATION PROBLEMS
The exposure analysis used in the community property states of
Texas37 and Washington 8 allows for "the benefits of credit acquisi-
33. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d 656 (1953). In Gudelj, the court required a
showing that the lender relied primarily on the spouse's separate property in extending
the loan.
34. Grinius, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 1187-88, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
35. See, e.g., Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal. App. 2d 144, 155, 27 Cal. Rptr. 307, 314
(1962).
36. This argument has been presented by both Richard L. Young in his article,
see Young, supra note 16, at 255, and by Timothy J. Paris in his article, Credit Acquisi-
tions During Marriage, 9 L.A. LAw No. 3, 11, 16 (1986).
37. See generally Goodloe v. Williams, 302 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957);
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tions to be allocated in accordance with the legal exposure of the
indebted parties." 9 With this approach, the evidentiary problems
are resolved because the parties avoid having to present evidence of
subjective lender's intent at the time the transaction was entered,
and instead, can rely upon direct evidence by presenting the promis-
sory notes and all other instruments of hypothecation. These docu-
ments will reflect the exposed assets available to the lender upon
default.40
From an equitable standpoint, it is far more appropriate to allo-
cate the benefits of a credit transaction to the parties who may suffer
due to default. Under a lender's intent analysis, the acquired prop-
erty may be characterized as the separate property of the borrowing
spouse. Nevertheless, upon default, the lender, regardless of his or
her initial intent, can pursue the community property for repayment,
even though the community property gained absolutely no benefit
Dillard v. Dillard, 341 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960). In Dillard, the husband
claimed that property acquired during marriage on credit was his separate property. He
claimed it was acquired by promising his separate property. However, an officer of the
lending bank testified that if it became necessary to collect the note, the bank would have
levied on any property, community or separate. Presented with this evidence, the Dillard
court relied upon Goodloe v. Williams, 302 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), and
stated, "property purchased during marriage by either spouse on credit is community
property unless an agreement exists that the separate estate of the vendee only shall be
looked to by the vendor for satisfaction of the credit extended." Dillard, 341 S.W.2d at
671 (emphasis added). Thus, the Dillard court held the property acquired on credit was
community in character. See also Young, supra note 16, at 243-45 (indepth review of
Texas cases addressing the exposure analysis).
38. See generally Finley v. Finley, 47 Wash. 2d 307, 287 P.2d 475 (1955); Kat-
terhagen v. Meistor, 75 Wash. 112, 134 P. 673 (1913). In Katterhagen, the trial court
found that the title to the property involved was taken in the name of George Meistor
and Mary Meistor. The purchase price was $6,500, and $1,600 was paid from separate
funds of George Meistor. The remainder of the purchase price came from a promissory
note and mortgage which was signed by George and Mary Meistor. But, the note and
mortgage were paid by George Meistor out of his separate funds. From these facts, the
trial court concluded that the property was the sole and separate property of George
Meistor. However, the Washington Supreme Court modified the judgment saying:
[George Meistor] paid $1,600 upon the purchase price from his separate funds.
To that extent the property was separate. The remainder, or $5,050, was paid
by the community. When the husband and wife united in the promissory note,
the debt created was a community debt, and the money borrowed upon the
note belonged to the community.
Id. at -, 134 P. at 674 (emphasis added).
The court held that 1600/6500 of the property was the husband's as separate property;
thus the court reimbursed George Meistor for his separate property contribution. The
remaining 5050/6500 was community property; thus the court allowed the community to
benefit from the risks of the debt. See also Young, Credit Acquisitions, supra note 16, at
245-51 (additional review of Washington case law confronting the exposure analysis).
39. Paris, supra note 36, at 16.
40. Id.
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from such liability. Under the exposure analysis, regardless of which
spouse borrows the money to purchase the property, the acquired
property is characterized totally in accordance with the risk alloca-
tion that will arise upon a default.
However, one commentator is quick to point out that some areas
in the exposure analysis still require the discretion of the court.
41
First, the exposure analysis will always result in a community prop-
erty characterization if the lender insists upon both spouses signing
the promissory note or other instruments of hypothecation. However,
a recent federal regulation forbids lenders from requiring both
spouses' signatures and from asking questions about a non-borrowing
spouse if the borrowing spouse states that the loan is sought based
solely on his or her separate property or personal use.42
Second, in many cases the separate property collateral may vastly
outweigh the pledged community property, and it would be unfair to
characterize the proceeds as community property when as a practical
matter the lender, in all likelihood, will pursue only the separate
property for repayment.43 In these cases, it may be appropriate to
characterize the proceeds in accordance with the proportion of sepa-
rate to community liabilities, instead of a unitary characterization.
Finally, there may be situations where a party used separate funds
to pay the down payment or loan payments. Here, the approach
taken by California Civil Code section 4800.214 appears appropriate.
The legislature allows the contributing spouse to be reimbursed for
his or her traceable separate property contribution. 45 However, the
41. Id.
42. See generally Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 816 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987). In Anderson,
the Ninth Circuit held it was a violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
when a creditor required an applicant's spouse to co-sign the promissory note if the appli-
cant individually qualified under the lender's standards of creditworthiness. Anderson,
666 F.2d at 1276-77. However, in ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that
lenders, in equal management community property states, such as California, did not
violate the ECOA when they sought the signature of the applicant's spouse on the prom-
issory note if the spouse's future earnings were considered in determining the
creditworthiness of the applicant. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 816 F.2d at 490-93. The
distinguishing point between Anderson and ITT Consumer Fin. Corp. is that in Ander-
son the applicant individually met the lender's credit worthiness standard, while in ITT
Consumer Fin. Corp., the applicant did not. As a result, ITT Consumer Fin. Corp. does
not remove the restrictions upon the lenders which would enable them to require both
signatures even if the applicant's spouse individually meets the lender's creditworthiness
standard. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 816 F.2d at 493.
43. Paris, supra note 36, at 16.
44. Id.
45. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (West 1988) provides in pertinent part:
In the division of community property under this part unless a party has made
a written waiver of the right to reimbursement or signed a writing that has the
effect of a waiver, the party shall be reimbursed for his or her contributions to
the acquisition of the property to the extent the party traces the contribution to
a separate property source.
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contributing spouse is not allowed compensation for the appreciation
in the value of the proceeds, nor is he or she penalized for
depreciation.46
V. THE APPLICATION OF THE EXPOSURE ANALYSIS TO
DETERMINE THE CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED ON
CREDIT DURING SEPARATION
Marriage continues throughout the separation period and, with
that in mind, one may expect the laws accompanying marriage to
remain consistent throughout separation. In some instances they do,
and in others they do not. First, it appears the community property
remains liable for all debts of either spouse throughout marriage.4"
At the same time, the separated spouses are allowed to retain their
earnings and accumulations acquired during separation as their sep-
arate property.4 8
With these conflicting principles in mind, California's Second Dis-
trict Court of Appeals in In re Marriage of Stephenson"9 confronted
the characterization of property acquired on credit during separa-
tion. In Stephenson, the husband, during separation, purchased real
property using $172,000 in funds from loans which he borrowed
from the pension plan at Stephenson and Son, Incorporated. 50 The
pension was comprised largely of community property.51
The court's initial analysis followed the normal lender's intent in-
quiry. While citing Gudelj,52 the court stated that "proceeds of a
loan acquired during marriage are community property .. . [this]
presumption is rebuttable upon a showing that the loan was extended
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 provides in pertinent part: "The amount reimbursed
shall be without interest or adjustment for change in monetary values and shall not ex-
ceed the net value of the property at the time of division."
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.110(a), which states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the community property is
liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage, regard-
less which spouse has the management and control of the property and regard-
less whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or to a judgment for
the debt.
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 which states in pertinent part: "The earnings and
accumulations of a spouse ... while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are
the separate property of the spouse."
49. 162 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 209 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
50. Id. at 1084, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
51. Id. at 1085, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
52. Id. at 1084, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (citing Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202,
210, 259 P.2d 656, 661 (1953)).
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on the faith of existing property belonging to the acquiring
spouse.
'53
After making this initial statement, the court acknowledged that
the analysis applies to post-separation loans, and not solely to loans
extended during marriage prior to separation,54 since during separa-
tion the lender still can recover against the community. However,
concern over which assets are liable in the event of a default is the
principle of the exposure analysis, not that of a lender's intent analy-
sis. Furthermore, with this relationship in mind, the court stated:
"Accordingly, the proceeds of a post-separation loan will be the sep-
arate property of the borrowing spouse if it is not obtained in ex-
change for community property and is, therefore, unrelated to the
community." 55
Conversely stated, the proceeds of a post-separation loan will be
community if they are obtained in exchange for community property
and are, therefore, related to the community. This is precisely the
rationale of the exposure analysis. If a spouse's assets become sub-
ject to liability, then he or she will enjoy the assets which this in-
debtedness acquires.
The issues which arise from Stephenson are: (a) Which circum-
stances create community liability during separation and (b) Why
was this real property not a post-separation "accumulation," and
therefore per se separate property of the acquiring spouse in accor-
dance with California Civil Code section 5118258 These two issues
are discussed in the following two sections.
VI. CREDIT LIABILITY DURING SEPARATION
Currently, California statutes fail to distinguish between the lia-
bilities for debts incurred before and after marital separation. The
statutes instead simply espouse a single principle concerning the pe-
riod covering the entire marriage. The governing statute, California
Civil Code section 5120.110(a) states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the community property
is liable for a debt of either spouse incurred before or during marriage,
regardless which spouse has the management and control of the property
and regardless whether both spouses are parties to the debt or to a judg-
ment to the debt.
57
53. Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1084, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
54. Id. (citing 1 C. MARKEY. CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 5.71 [4] (1984)).
55. Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 1085, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
56. This section provides that earnings and accumulations of a spouse while living
separate are considered separate property. See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
57. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5120.110(a). California, like most community property
states, employs a system that is most favorable to creditors. The general rule, which is
subject to certain exceptions, allows for creditors to satisfy their debts out of property
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Continuous liability throughout marriage is claimed to rest on Cali-
fornia family law recognizing marriage and the incidents of marital
status continuing until divorce or the death of one spouse.5 8 How-
ever, in reviewing the case law, there appears to be a consistent limi-
tation placed upon the creditor's reach for loans received after
separation.
A. Case Analysis of Creditor's Rights on Post-Separation
Loans Since the Enactment of the
Family Law Act
In the 1977 case of In re Marriage of Hopkins,59 the wife in-
curred certain liabilities after separation, namely, miscellaneous de-
partment store charges.6 0 The then current California statute, Civil
Code section 5116,61 called for the community to be liable for any
debt incurred by either spouse during marriage. 62 However, in Hop-
kins the Second District Court of Appeals chose to limit the statute's
scope, holding that because the debts had occurred after separation
and were not related to the community, the community should not
be liable for such debts.6 3 In arriving at this decision, the court rec-
ognized that the earnings and accumulations of each spouse after
separation were the separate property of that spouse,64 and thus rea-
soned that debts incurred after separation also should be separate.6 5
The court assessed whether the indebtedness benefited the commu-
nity. In this case, the indebtedness did not benefit the community
over which the debtor spouse has management and control. Thus in California, where
there is equal management and control over the community property, a creditor can pur-
sue both the separate property of the debtor spouse and all the community property.
CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMM'N, LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY FOR DEBTS,
(Jan. 1984) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMM'N].
58. Only death or a final judgment of dissolution or nullity terminates marriage.
CAL. ClV. CODE § 4350 (West 1983). Accordingly, an informal separation, an interlocu-
tory judgment of dissolution, or a decree of legal separation does not affect a party's
status as a spouse. See, e.g., In re Estate of Devigia, 162 Cal. 51, 121 P. 320 (1912)
(woman held entitled to family allowance from decedent's estate as his widow despite
earlier entry of an interlocutory decree of divorce).
59. 74 Cal. App. 3d 591, 141 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1977).
60. Id. at 600, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
61. Id. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 5116 (repealed 1969). The substance of former
Civil Code § 5116 is continued in CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.110(a), see 17 CAL. L. REV.
COMM. REPORTS 1, 30 (1984).
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5116.
63. Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d at 600, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
64. Id. (relying on CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118).
65. Hopkins, 74 Cal. App. 3d at 600, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
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since the debts were incurred for the wife's personal use and thus,
were not "related" to the community. 6
The "relatedness test" was applied five years later in In re Mar-
riage of Munguia.17 The debt involved a fee for private investigator
services that was incurred by the husband during separation. The
wife had secreted the children in Europe, and the husband hired the
investigator to locate and return them to the United States. 8 In
Munguia, the First District Court of Appeals held that the debt was
unrelated to the community and thus should be deemed separate.69
The court based its relatedness conclusion on a statement made by
the husband's attorney which described the obligation as "perhaps
rash and indiscreetly [and possibly not] prudently" incurred. 70 How-
ever, the court appeared to imply that if the safety of the children
had been truly in jeopardy, the liability incurred by the husband for
investigative services would be attributed to the community. Thus,
since both spouses are liable for the well-being of their children, any
liability incurred while procuring their safety would be related to the
community.
A year later, in the Stephenson71 case, the Second District Court
of Appeals considered the concept of relatedness for a second time.
To repeat the facts, the husband, after separation, borrowed
$172,000 from Stephenson and Son, Incorporated Pension Plan
Trust which was a community property asset.72 The court stated: "If
a post-separation loan is 'unrelated' to the community, then the
courts have uniformly held the borrowing spouse solely liable for the
debt."'73 The court determined that the loan was related to the com-
munity since it was obtained in exchange for community property. 4
The final case in the series of post-separation loans is American
Olean Tile Co. v. Schultze.75 In American Olean Tile, the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeals placed additional limitations on creditors'
rights. The court reviewed creditor's rights on a loan incurred after
the husband and wife had not only separated but also executed a
marital settlement agreement dividing their property.76 The husband
received as his separate property the prior community property of H
& S Tile, which later became indebted to American Olean Tile
66. Id., 141 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
67. 146 Cal. App. 3d 853, 195 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1983).
68. Id. at 861-62, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
69. Id. at 862, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
70. Id., 195 Cal. Rptr. at 203-04.
71. 162 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 209 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
72. Id. at 1084, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
73. Id. at 1085, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 401 (emphasis added).
74. Id., 209 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
75. 169 Cal. App. 3d 359, 215 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985).
76. Id. at 364, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
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Company. The wife, on the other hand, received some undisclosed
assets. Soon thereafter, the husband defaulted on the loan to Ameri-
can Olean Tile Company, which in turn sought relief against the
wife. The court, relying on an obscure interpretation of California
Civil Code section 5118, stated that "income earned and obligations
incurred after separation in the operation of a separate property bus-
iness are not community in nature." 78 Thus, the court held that the
wife was not liable for the husband's debts incurred while the
spouses were separated.79
The court's interpretation is obscure because California Civil Code
section 5118 mentions nothing about obligations incurred, but solely
addresses the earnings and accumulations of a separated spouse
while separated. 0 The First District Court interpreted Civil Code
section 5118 to encompass that if the earnings and accumulations
are to be the separate property of the separated spouse, then equita-
bly, the debts incurred by the separated spouse which are unrelated
to the community then should be the debts of that indebted, sepa-
rated party.81
77. Id. at 363, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
78. Id. at 364, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (citing Civil Code section 5118 which states
in pertinent part: "The earnings and accumulations of a spouse ... while living separate
and apart ... are the separate property of the spouse." CAL. CIv. CODE § 5118).
79. American Olean Tile Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
80. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118.
81. Additionally, in American Olean Tile Co., the court was confronted with the
issue of whether a valid transmutation of community property assets from community
property to separate property of each spouse could then immunize the assets from subse-
quent debts incurred by a separated spouse. The court held that the valid transmutation
effectively will immunize the prior community property assets which had become sepa-
rate property; thus the only manner for the creditor to satisfy the debt is to pursue the
separate property of the debtor spouse. American Olean Tile Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d at
364, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
The court mentioned exceptions to this general rule, holding that the community prop-
erty remains liable if the transmutation agreement is entered into either to defraud an
existing creditor of either spouse, or if the creditor is misled to its detriment by the
failure of the spouses to inform it that by virtue of an agreement between the spouses,
the supposed community assets on which the creditor relied were in fact separate assets.
Id. at 364, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
The enforcement of a valid transmutation agreement thereby shielding the nondebtor
spouse from incurring liability was reiterated in Kennedy v. Taylor, 155 Cal. App. 3d
126, 201 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1984). In Kennedy, the court stated: "Third party contract
creditor[s] can easily avoid the risk of unknown interspousal transfer (and the embarass-
ment or burden of inquiring about them) by obtaining both spouses' signatures on
notes . . . .Obtaining both spouses' signatures is a reasonable burden to place on credi-
tors." Id. at 130, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
This argument could be applied regardless of the existence of a valid transmutation
agreement, for it may be more reasonable for a creditor to require both signatures rather
than "a separated and noncontracting spouse . . . to police the financial dealings of his
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B. Summary of Creditor's Rights
The courts, when regarding post-separation loans, strictly have
limited the application of California Civil Code section 5120.110(a)
or its predecessor, California Civil Code section 5116, which have
held the community property liable for debts incurred by either
spouse during the entire marriage. Prior to assessing liability on the
community property or to either spouse's separate property for post-
separation debts, the courts initially look to see if the loan relates to
the community. If so, the community is liable. Conversely, if the
loan is unrelated to the community, then it becomes the separate
liability of the debtor spouse.
Relatedness entails two circumstances. The first is whether the lia-
bility incurred benefits the community; the second is whether the
loan is obtained in exchange for community property. If either cir-
cumstance exists, then the liability is related to the community, thus
creating a community property liability.
VII. THE QUALIFICATION OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION
5118 - EARNINGS AND ACCUMULATIONS ACQUIRED AFTER
SEPARATION
California Civil Code section 5118 was written to enable the sepa-
rated spouse to become self-sufficient after the break-up of the com-
munity. It states in pertinent part: "The earnings and accumulations
of a spouse . . . while living separate and apart from the other
spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."'82 The area of in-
quiry for this Comment concerns the qualification of the terms of
"earnings" and "accumulations" within section 5118,83 since adher-
ence to the plain meaning of the statute would require all property
acquired on credit during separation to be characterized as the sole
property of the acquiring spouse.
Earnings under section 5118 have been construed broadly to en-
compass virtually any form of compensation for a spouse's time and
efforts, including any income derived from the fruits of labor and
or her contracting spouse and to remain ever vigilant to notify prospective creditors of
the true status of their marital relationship and respective assets." Id. A problem arises,
however, with the legality of a creditor requiring both spouses to sign a promissory note.
See Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. ITT
Consumer Fin. Corp., 816 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987). See generally supra note 42. For
further discussion of liability after division of property, see CALIFORNIA LAW REVIsION
COMM'N, supra note 57, at 9-11.
82. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118.
83. Discussion of "living separate and apart" within CAL. CIv. CODE § 5118 is
beyond this Comment. For a discussion of "living and apart" within Cal. Civ. Code §
5118 see Comment, Living Separate and Apart Under section 5118 of the Family Law
Act-Effects and Implications of the Bargaining Decision, 6 W. ST. U.L. REV. 183 (1979).
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services. 84 However, earnings exclude income derived with the aid of
capital. 85
Accumulations have received a similarly broad interpretation. In
1910, the California Supreme Court,8" applying Civil Code section
169,87 defined accumulation as "any property which a person ac-
quires and retains . . . [except where] . . .acquired by . . . [a]
purchase with community funds, or in exchange for other commu-
nity property." 88 Relying upon this definition, courts have found as
accumulations under section 5118, the temporary support payments
received by a spouse after separation;89 real property previously held
in joint tenancy by both spouses and subsequently purchased by a
single spouse after separation at a foreclosure sale with funds ad-
vanced by a third party;90 and damages received for wrongful death
of a child of the marriage while in the custody of a spouse after
separation. 1 The property in these cases, the temporary support pay-
ments, the real property, and the wrongful death award, were items
neither acquired in exchange for community property nor purchased
with community funds, and thus are within the meaning of section
5118.
Conversely, in Stephenson,92 the court recognized that the real
property acquired by the spouse using a loan pledged against the
84. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Behrens, 137 Cal. App. 3d 562, 573, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 200, 206 (1982), in which the court held a corporation's post-separation contribu-
tions to a spouse's profit-sharing account were intended to be a form of compensation,
and thus were separate property under section 5118.
85. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 438, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 584, 590 (1975), in which the court held the earnings of a corporation are not,
generally speaking, the earnings of the individual stockholder or stockholders, but are
"profits" of the corporation to be distributed usually in the form of dividends.
86. Union Oil Co. v. Stewart, 158 Cal. 149, 110 P. 313 (1910).
87. CAL. CIv. CODE § 169 (repealed 1969). CAL. CIv. CODE § 169 stated: "The
earnings and accumulations of the wife ... while she is living separate from her hus-
band, are the separate property of the wife." Id. The Family Law Act which became
operative January 1, 1970 recodified CAL. CIV. CODE § 169 to CAL. CIv. CODE § 5118.
The text of the statute remained the same. It was not until 1971 that Civ. Code § 5118
was amended and now states: "The earnings and accumulations of a spouse ... while
living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."
CAL. CIv. CODE § 5118. See also Bruch, The Legal Import of Informal Marital Separa-
tions: A Survey of California Law and a Call for Change, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1015
(1977).
88. Union Oil Co., 158 Cal. at 156, 110 P. at 316.
89. In re Marriage of Wall, 29 Cal. App. 3d 76, 79, 105 Cal. Rptr. 201, 203
(1972).
90. Richardson v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App. 638, 644, 281 P. 1077, 1080
(1929).
91. Christiana v. Rose, 100 Cal. App. 2d 46, 56, 222 P.2d 891, 897-98 (1950).
92. 162 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 209 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
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community assets was in essence an exchange for community prop-
erty. Thus, the property was not an accumulation within the mean-
ing of section 5118 .9
In summary, when property is acquired on credit during separa-
tion and the loan is obtained in exchange for liability on community
assets, then this accumulation is not governed by California Civil
Code section 5118. Therefore, the property is not per se the separate
property of the acquiring spouse.
VIII. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SEPARATED BORROWING SPOUSE TO
AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS OR HER SEPARATE CREDIT
PURCHASES BECOMING THE PROPERTY OF THE COMMUNITY UNDER
THE CURRENT CALIFORNIA LAW.
Under the present California lender's intent rule, it is important
for the borrowing spouse to obtain written statements from lenders
specifying exactly what the lender relied upon in extending the loan
and to insure that the lender does in fact do so. The borrowing
spouse should specify to the lender that the loan is solely for his or
her separate use and, therefore, his or her signature alone is required
on the promissory notes and other instruments of hypothecation. The
borrowing spouse should insist that only separate property assets are
to be used as collateral and method of repayment. Furthermore, he
or she should inform the lender of the separation, thus establishing
the uncertainty of separate property rights on the community prop-
erty assets. The borrowing spouse should propose an agreement with
the nondebting spouse stating that all post-separation debts are the
liability of the debting spouse and the community property is free
from any such liability. Finally, if possible, the spouse should enact
and record a valid transmutation agreement for all community prop-
erty and present this to the lender for his or her records.94
Additionally, to alleviate the uncertainties, the legislature should
both amend current legislation and enact new legislation. A few sug-
gestions are presented in the remaining part of this Comment.
A. Proposed Amendments to Existing Statutes
1. Civil Code Section 5118 Earnings of Separated
Spouse as Separate Property
Section 5118 states that earnings and accumulations acquired dur-
ing separation are the separate property of the acquiring spouse.
However, "accumulations" currently is not defined. Thus, an addi-
93. Id. at 1085, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
94. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 87, at 1026-27.
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tional subsection should be added to the statute. The following is a
proposed definition of "accumulations" within section 5118:
(b) Accumulations within this section include all property acquired and re-
tained except where acquired by a purchase with communify funds, or in
exchange for other community property.
This amendment not only would define accumulations but also would
limit the current all-inclusive use of accumulations to only that prop-
erty that was not purchased with community funds, or in exchange
for community property. As a result, accumulations during separa-
tion are the separate property of the acquiring spouse only if ac-
quired by his or her earnings, skill and time during the separation
period, or in exchange for separate property of the separated acquir-
ing spouse.
2. Civil Code Section 5120.110: Community Property Liability
for Debt of Either Spouse
Section 5120.110(a) presently states that the community property
is liable for all debts incurred by a spouse before or during marriage.
This statute should be amended to require a distinction between
debts incurred by a spouse during marriage but prior to separation
and those debts incurred after separation. A proposed amendment
reads as follows:
(a)(i) Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the community
property is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during mar-
riage up until the point of separation, regardless of which spouse has the
management and control of the property and regardless of whether one or
both spouses are parties to the debt or to a judgment for the debt.
(ii) During the period between separation and dissolution of marriage, the
community property is liable for debts incurred by either spouse which are
related to the community. Debts incurred during this period which are un-
related to the community are the separate debt of the indebting spouse.
This amendment would leave unchanged the current credit liability
of the spouses during marriage up until separation. However, during
separation only those debts incurred to benefit the community will
become liabilities of the community. Such an amendment would cor-
respond with Civil Code section 5118. Thus, if the accumulation was
to benefit the community, then the community would become liable
for such a debt; however, the accummulation would be classified as a
community property asset following the exposure analysis.
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B. Proposed New Legislation:
Credit Acquisitions During Marriage
Currently, the California legislature has yet to address credit ac-
quisitions during marriage. This area requires codification which
should resolve both the inconsistencies and inequities in the present
case law. There is no need to distinguish between acquisitions made
prior to or after separation; since, in either case, the property charac-
terization is determined by the liabilities incurred. The suggested
section should read:
The proceeds of credit acquisitions during marriage are determined by the
character of the assets exposed upon incurring the liability to acquire such
assets. If both separate and community property assets are exposed upon
incurring the debt, then the proceeds should be apportioned by the propor-
tion of liability incurred by the exposed assets.
This proposed new legislation would remove California's current
lender's intent analysis and statutorily impose the exposure analysis
currently used in the community property states of Texas and
Washington."
IX. CONCLUSION
The courts, in characterizing proceeds and property acquired on
credit during separation, appear to have adopted the exposure analy-
sis. To avoid further confusion and inequitable results, this Comment
recommends an across-the-board adoption of the exposure analysis
for all characterizations of credit acquisition throughout the
marriage.
To apply the exposure analysis, knowledge of the parties' potential
credit liability is required. In California, the community becomes lia-
ble for a post-separation debt if the loan relates to the community.
The loan will relate to the community if either the liability incurred
benefits the community, or the loan is obtained in exchange for com-
munity property.
Furthermore, during the separation period, not all accumulations
are the separate property of the acquiring spouse. Accumulations
which are obtained in exchange for liability on community assets are
not governed by California Civil Code section 5118, and thus are not
per se the separate property of the acquiring spouse. Both these prin-
ciples are advanced within the proposed amendments to current leg-
islation and suggested new legislation.
In the introductory hypothetical, a post-separation loan was ex-
tended to Husband which resulted in an accumulation during sepa-
95. For discussion concerning the exposure analysis, see supra notes 37-55 and
accompanying text.
1090
[VOL. 25: 1071. 1988] Credit Acquisitions During Post Separation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ration of $400,000. Adhering to the principles propounded by this
Comment, first, Civil Code section 5118 automatically does not re-
quire the accumulation as the separate property of the acquiring
spouse, since only accumulations that were acquired without ex-
changing liability on community assets are separate property of the
acquiring spouse. Additionally, the proceeds should not be character-
ized by the lender's intent analysis, but instead by the exposure anal-
ysis. Thus, reviewing the assets exposed reveals that both Husband's
separate property and community property assets were exposed when
extending the loan. In such a case, the court should have discretion
to apportion the proceeds in the proportion of separate to community
liability. In addition, the court should give weight to the likely ave-
nue of recovery.
In the introductory case, the community assets vastly outweigh the
separate assets. In addition, upon default, the lender in all likelihood
would seek repayment from the pledged community assets of A.B.
Research, instead of attempting to collect on Husband's prospective
salary. Considering these factors, the community should benefit from
the potential liability. Thus, the proceeds should be entirely commu-
nity property, and as such, shared between Husband and Wife.
WM. CURTIS BARNES, JR.
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